

**Legitimacy and Reason:
A Primer for Reduction of Tension between
the Western and Arab-Islamic Worlds**

**A Monograph
by
MAJ Mark D. Brown
U.S. Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MAJ Mark D. Brown

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Approved by:

Timothy Challans, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

Director,
School of Advanced
Military Studies

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,
Graduate Degree
Programs

Abstract

LEGITIMACY AND REASON: A PRIMER FOR REDUCTION OF TENSION BETWEEN THE WESTERN AND ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLDS by MAJ Mark D. Brown, US Army, 52 pages.

This monograph attempts to define the underlying cause of today's tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds, along with identification of existing similarities which can be utilized and exploited to bring about common understanding and peaceful resolution. The cause is determined to be differing perceptions of legitimacy. To develop a common understanding of why these differences exist, the monograph demonstrates the continuing applicability of classical Greek logic and reason as taught by Plato and Aristotle and interpreted by early prominent Arab-Islamic philosophers. Common thought provides the basis for timeless understanding of common problems, issues, and concerns. Divergent thought, grounded in religious dogma and myth, opens windows toward political opportunism, isolationism, misunderstanding, and fear. Grounding in similar classic thought provides the initial ability for both sides to address the tension through common logic and reason.

Attention is then paid to ascertaining the political, social, and religious similarities present today and in seventeenth century Great Britain- the context for formulation and testing of the logical political theories presented in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* and John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*. Hobbes' and Locke's theories addressing states of nature and political legitimacy form the baseline for understanding today's tension in purely Western terms. Their theories are grounded in similar concerns over security, authenticity, political representation, religious freedom, self-determination, and economic prosperity, and both are devoid of unfounded and divisive rhetoric. These same political, social, and religious conditions are present, in modified form, in today's tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds, and therefore both philosophers theories can be utilized in explaining, understanding, predicting, and judging today's outcomes. Continued misunderstanding of common issues and concerns leads to unbalanced application of both Hobbes' and Locke's theories, and contributes greatly to differing perceptions of legitimacy.

When applying both theories to explain today's tension, it is then demonstrated that interaction between Hobbes' appeals for unchallenged sovereignty to ensure security and Locke's support for the inherent right to resist perceived illegitimate authority contributes directly to the tension. A perpetual cycle of violence results between interventionist and insurgent entities vying for control and influence. Reinforced with rhetoric which encourages extreme acts, coupled with overemphasis on cultural differences at the expense of commonalities based on logic and reason, the tension is only exacerbated and solutions appear even more distant.

The monograph concludes with the assertion that reduction, if not resolution, of today's tension requires common understanding and acceptance of legitimacy by both sides. This can be obtained through encouraged application of reason and focus on interests, issues, and concerns common to both the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds, all while minimizing cultural differences and avoiding political, social, and religious rhetoric. Logic and reason exist independently of current contextual conditions, and can be universally applied. Additionally, a balanced application of both Hobbes' and Locke's ideas is required. To remain wedded to a singular approach without periodic analysis and reevaluation will only sustain the perpetual cycle of violence through the end of the twenty-first century, and will serve to destroy any chance of achieving legitimacy.

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INTRODUCTION: Illegitimacy as a Catalyst for Tension

Theologians and scholars have recently developed a large number of theories of causality to describe today's tension between the Western and Eastern worlds, or more specifically between the United States and the Arab-Islamic community. Western thinkers have tended to gravitate towards explanations involving terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction/mass effect, Israel's security, unimpeded flow of oil and other natural resources, strategic instability, Islamic extremism, and an ongoing clash of civilizations. Conversely, Arab-Islamic thinkers have repeatedly cited Western imperialism and interventionism, American hegemonic aspirations, U.S. indifference to democracy and culture in the Arab world, indiscriminate U.S. support for Israel, and corrupt Western morals.¹ Additional explanations involve Islamic aversion to reason and authority vs. Western aversion to religious rhetoric and insistence on order and authority. While certain aspects of these arguments hold true in all cases; some do not. Furthermore, these various causal theories can likely be boiled down to one simple source-differing perceptions of legitimacy.

For the purposes of this paper, the definition used to describe the term *tension* "includes insecurity, anxiety, and frustration, but it includes both the disagreeable *and* the agreeable sensations of wanting."² Tension is manifested as "a state in which one force opposes another force."³ Additionally:

The irrational ways in which people cope with this phenomenon of anxiety (tension), the ways they relieve the symptoms but not the illness itself, run the gamut probably of all neurotic behavior. They range from such phenomena as compulsion, projection of guilt outward, aggression, displacement of aggression, ridicule of the cause of tension, identification with the aggressor,

¹ Graham E. Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palmgrave Macmillan, 2004), 146.

² James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics- The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, 1963), 64.

³ Ibid, 65.

identification with the defender (in which one delegates power not to the aggressive enemy but” to the defender of one’s amorphous self), and to a withdrawal from the real world into a world of fantasy where the problems either do not exist or are automatically solved by magic helpers. Aggression is another often irrational reaction to the kind of tension that is called frustration.⁴

Legitimate is defined as, “complying with the law or recognized standards”, and

Sovereignty is defined as “one who possesses supreme authority”- both according to Webster’s New International Dictionary. Additionally, the assumption is made that both the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds will agree on these definitions. Finally, *Arabic* and *Islamic* are terms used interchangeably throughout this work due to predominant unification through common language.

To properly research and present this hypothesis, the following questions are considered: What are the similar philosophical groundings, if any, between Western and Islamic ways of thinking, and are they still in effect today? Do the 17th century political, social, and religious conditions, coupled with the philosophical theories proposed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and based on their experiences within those same conditions, apply to today’s tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds? Does the unwitting and unbalanced practice of these reciprocating theories contribute directly to the cycle of violence witnessed today, and what additional sources of tension compound the problem? Finally, how can this tension be reduced?

The body of the work begins with a description of the philosophical underpinnings present in both Western and Islamic thought, along with the similarities and differences in the conduct of epistemology, which will begin to indirectly justify the current applicability of Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories based on common logic and reason. This is important because of the prevailing assertion of mythos over logos:

The term *logos*, the root word of “logic,” refers to the sum total of our rational understanding of the world. *Mythos* is the sum total of the early historic and prehistoric myths which preceded the logos. The mythos includes not only

⁴ Ibid, 82-3.

the Greek myths but the Old Testament, the Vedic Hymns and the early legends of all cultures which have contributed to our present world understanding. The mythos-over-logos argument states that our rationality is shaped by these legends, that our knowledge today is in relation to these legends as a tree is in relation to the little shrub it once was.⁵

It can easily be said that both mythos and logos influence Western and Arab-Islamic philosophy to a more balanced extent than in classic Eastern thought. However, the tendency exists, partially reinforced through observation of fundamentalist activities, for Western thinkers to assert that Arab-Islamic thinking is predominantly motivated by mythos rather than logos. However, it will be shown that Arab-Islamic thinking is grounded in Western logic and reason as taught by influential Greek thinkers such as Aristotle and Plato. Alternative viewpoints concerning perceptions of political legitimacy and authority, consciously or sub-consciously grounded in classical Western philosophical thought and primarily based on logos rather than mythos, are largely contributing to the current tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds- both of which are currently focused more on differences than similarities.

The conflicting yet applicable theories provided by Thomas Hobbes in his work *Leviathan* and John Locke in his *Second Treatise of Government* then provide the correct perspective concerning the root causes of current tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds. The similarities of thought inherent in both Hobbes' and Locke's perspectives, which exist independently from their original contexts, provide further revelation into the possible applicability of their theories to today's tension due to their continuing existence and influence. Specifically targeting their views concerning the state of nature and man's willingness to recognize legitimate sovereignty, a potentially workable solution can be developed for both sides. The problem involves ascertaining the root causes of today's tension in an effort to find solutions

⁵ Robert M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 358.

more acceptable to both parties- solutions grounded in reason and similarity rather than rhetoric and divergence. These causes must be understood by Western policy makers in Western terms, for if Western theories can be applied to explain the positions adopted by both sides of the tension, then Western approaches to the Islamic world can be modified to address common core issues in ways that make sense. This provides credence to the oft-cited phrase, 'If you were in my shoes, you would have done the same thing.' Political theories are designed to explain, understand, predict, and judge human behavior, and the reciprocating Western theories of Hobbes and Locke can assist in understanding today's tension.

A comparative analysis of Hobbes' and Locke's theories involving the state of nature, developed during the same period of social, political and religious strife in seventeenth century Great Britain, indicate another underlying source of tension. This in turn provides a larger baseline for determining how their theories apply to today's antagonists. Hobbes asserts that the violent state of nature compels a man through fear and awe to enter into covenants or social contracts, accept unopposed sovereignty, and willingly give up basic human rights to prevent constant war resulting from each man's conflicting rights to life, liberty, and property:

It may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate into a civil war. ⁶

Hobbes' theory has the potential to conflict with Locke's theory asserting that the state of nature necessitates the formulation of governing bodies and laws to ensure continued liberty and self-determination. According to Locke, man has a natural right to reject and rebel against any sovereign authority which is perceived to be illegitimate, much as an adolescent rebels against parental rule. The current tension is described utilizing these differing states of nature, perceived

⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. (Idaho: University of Idaho)
<http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hobbes%20Leviathan/FIRST.txt>

purposes of the state and political justice, and preferred methods of governance. For reinforcement of this monograph's thesis, it is necessary to draw some general inferences concerning the similarities, differences, and importance of the political, social, and religious conditions present in both seventeenth century Great Britain and the twenty-first century world. Additionally, the assertion is made that religion plays a supporting role to that of political control and influence in determining the underlying source of tension.

Focus will then redirect toward the participants' differing recognition of legitimate authority and use of force, free-will and determinism, and the inherent right to resist. Again, the philosophical theories presented by Hobbes and Locke are used to compare and contrast the two parties current and opposing viewpoints. A comparative analysis is provided of various Western and Arab-Islamic political, social, and religious documents, proclamations, and weblogs released since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Coupled with the obvious emotional rhetoric employed by both sides, this analysis will demonstrate that as long as antagonists continue to conversely apply the theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the largely identical reciprocating cycles of violence present in both seventeenth century Great Britain and today will continue unabated.

This monograph concludes with a recap of the timeless aspects of the primary source of tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds- reasoned, common perception of legitimacy. This is easily explained utilizing the timelessly applicable theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, which are grounded in *reason* (logos). Both reason and logic are historical components of thought demonstrated by both participating parties, and remain universally applicable despite differing cultural contexts within today's tension. The issue of continuing or intensifying current divisive approaches as called for by some pundits based on flawed deterministic arguments is evaluated to determine its desired and actual effects. Finally, some recommended solutions based on reason to restore and bolster legitimacy between the antagonists are provided in an attempt to alleviate rather than perpetuate today's tension.

Grounding of Classical Philosophies and Propensity for Logic

To divide philosophy into Western and other forms is open to criticism and challenge, for Arab-Islamic philosophy in several respects overlaps with Western philosophy. Western classical thinking is grounded in the ancient conflict between philosophers who espoused logic and reason, or *logos*, and Sophists who practiced emotionally-charged rhetoric based on *mythos*. This conflict was brought to the forefront by the classical writings of Plato, who despised the Sophists:

Plato's hatred of the rhetoricians was part of a much larger struggle in which the reality of the Good, represented by the Sophists (teachers of "wisdom"), and the reality of the True, represented by the dialecticians, were engaged in a huge struggle for the future mind of man.⁷

Although the roots of Eastern (Oriental) and Western (Greek) philosophies followed different paths and lines of thinking, Arabic thinkers began a concerted effort to incorporate the teachings of Greek philosophy into their conduct of epistemology after the Persian and Arab conquest of Alexandria between 616 and 641 A.D. The infusion of translated works found in the library until its destruction by fire in 642 led to the development of medieval Arabic *falsafa*, or Greek/Western-inspired philosophy. *Falsafa* "is *Arabic* philosophy because it is philosophy that begins with the rendering of Greek thought, in all its complexity, into the Arabic language."⁸ Grounded in *logos*, and widely practiced throughout the Arab-Islamic world by the ninth century, *falsafa* remained largely unabated until the wide-spread apostolic imposition of Muhammad's prophesies contained in the Qur'an and the expansion of the Islamic caliphate. This forced a reversion toward a more closed, esoteric, and sophist philosophical focus with the advent of *Sufism*- a theocratic form of *mythos* employing parable, allegory, and metaphor. However, the dramatic efforts of four key Arab-Islamic thinkers kept the practice of *falsafa* intact and ensured

⁷ Robert M. Pirsig, *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 381.

⁸ Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

its continuing, although increasingly limited, influence in Arab-Islamic thinking until the advent of the medieval Crusades during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and resulting expulsion of all aspects of Western culture and thought.

The body of classical Greek works selected for translation demonstrates that the classical or formative period of Arabic philosophy possesses grounding in logos, and encompasses two primary fields— philosophy and science. The works of Plato and Aristotle, along with other “hermetic, Gnostic, and neo-Platonic writings”, encapsulate the majority of the philosophical topics of translation. Greek works concerning the study of medicine, astrology and astronomy, alchemy and chemistry, physics, and mathematics were the predominant scientific subjects of Arabic inquiry and translation.⁹ Interestingly, it was standard Arabic practice to study Aristotle before Plato to ensure a better understanding of metaphysics and theology through the exercise of preliminary logic and physics:

At the end of antiquity, especially in the Alexandrian area which was to fall under Islamic rule shortly thereafter, Aristotle was seen as the unexcelled master of scientific learning in logic, physics, cosmology, natural science, and psychology. The architecture of theoretical knowledge was no longer crowned by the theological interpretation of Plato’s dialogues.¹⁰

By the ninth century A.D. Aristotle would be identified throughout the Arab-Islamic school of philosophy as “First Teacher,” and “the subsequent exposition of supreme theological truth was entrusted to Plato.”¹¹ During this period of translation and infusion, which began in

⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 74.

¹⁰ Christina D’Ancona, “Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C., Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 18.

¹¹ Ibid, 15.

earnest during the during the Abbāsid caliphate,¹² Arab-Islamic epistemology exercised Aristotle's use of empirical inquiry, classification, and rudimentary experimentation. Coupled with Neo-Platonist dialectical practices, these teachings were utilized to evaluate and understand the physical and metaphysical worlds. Neo-Platonists held the belief that human perfection and happiness could be achieved in the physical world, without awaiting an afterlife. *Ilm-al-Kalām*, a rational Arabic philosophy seeking to validate theological principals through dialectic, strove to provide logical explanations of the doctrines in the Qur'an using Neo-Platonist teachings to reconcile both religion and reason and the metaphysical and physical worlds.

Revered throughout the Arab-Islamic world as “the philosopher of the Arabs,”¹³ Ya'qūb ibn Is'hāq al-Kindī's (801-873 A.D.) philosophical concerns based on kalām partly guided the choice of which Greek texts would be translated into Arabic. Al-Kindī asserted that Greek logical thought could be utilized in developing solutions for contemporary Arabic philosophical problems including those emerging from the application of kalām. He argued, “inquiry into the truth is greatly assisted by those who have achieved truth in the past.”¹⁴ Concerning the tension between philosophy and prophesy, al-Kindī espoused the idea that although both practices would arrive at the same conclusions based on the same underlying logic. Yet prophesy was increasingly regarded as better suited for simplistically describing those logical conclusions to the masses using rhetoric and embellishment:

¹² Peter Adamson, “Al-Kindī (801-873) and the reception of Greek Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 32.

¹³ Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor, introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

¹⁴ Peter Adamson, “Al-Kindī (801-873) and the reception of Greek Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34.

The superiority of the prophet...is due only to two things: the ease and certainty with which he achieves the truth, and the way he presents it (his statement is briefer, clearer, and more complete). The crucial implication is that the *content* of the philosopher's and the prophet's knowledge are the same.¹⁵

"The translation and study of philosophic texts were essentially a religious activity and the influence of Greek thought on Muslim theology was very considerable...It was from Greek works on politics that (the Arabs) acquired certain basic notions on the nature of the state and the relationship between ruler and ruled."¹⁶ Yet many Islamic fundamentalists and clerics grew to perceive these practices as directly opposed to prophesy, religious dogma, and their legitimacy. Translations of Greek writings on politics and philosophy were slowly marginalized, for their propensity to encourage questioning and scrutiny of ideas and traditionalist practices threatened to undermine the authority of the caliphate. However, due to the early infusion of classical Western thought into the formulation of *falsafa*, Arab-Islamic thinking contains three key assumptions still active, either consciously or sub-consciously, today:

(1) Philosophy is a systematic whole, whose roots lie in logic and whose peak is rational theology; (2) all the Greek philosophers agree on a limited, but important, set of doctrines concerning the cosmos, the human soul, and the first principle; (3) philosophical truths do not derive from the Qur'an, even if they fit perfectly with it.¹⁷

Turning to the most influential Arabic thinkers during this area of translation and infusion, three key players expound on the ideas and practices exhibited by al-Kindī: Al-Fārābī (870-950 A.D.), Avicenna (980-1037 A.D.), and Averroes (1126-1198 A.D.). Like al-Kindī, Al-Fārābī's thinking is grounded in logic, science, philosophy, and math, and he is regarded as both

¹⁵ Ibid, 47.

¹⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 74.

¹⁷ Christina D'Ancona, "Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C., Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21.

the founder of Islamic political philosophy and the second major philosopher of the Islamic period- affectionately labeled the “Second Teacher” after Aristotle.¹⁸ He emphasized that the understanding of both classes of physical and theoretical science demanded the study and practice of logical inquiry and discourse- “the supreme tool of scientific inquiry and the only means by which humans can perfect the ability to deliberate well about different objects of thought, and more significantly, guard the mind against error.”¹⁹ Mirroring thoughts expressed by his predecessor concerning the tension between philosophies and prophesy, Al-Fārābī’ believed that:

While perfect philosophers are capable of attaining the truth through demonstrative proof, what about the remainder of people, who are either incapable or unwilling to tread the path to happiness?...Philosophers think in demonstrative syllogisms,...the role of prophecy, in both its religious and social function, serves to transform demonstrative truth into a rhetorical form understandable by the remainder of people.²⁰

The translation movement came to an end in the tenth century, by which time a considerable body of Greek philosophical and scientific material had been translated into Arabic. The progress of Arabization among Christian minorities, coupled with increased theological pressures emanating from Islamic leaders and clerics, made it increasingly difficult to find scholars with the requisite knowledge of Greek and Western language and thought. Additionally, “while Islam was still expanding and receptive, Western Europe had little or nothing to offer but rather flattered Muslim pride with the spectacle of a culture that was visibly and palpably

¹⁸ Charles E. Butterworth, “Ethical and Political Philosophy,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 275.

¹⁹ David C. Resiman, “Al-Fārābī (870-950) and the Philosophical Curriculum,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 65.

²⁰ Ibid, 67.

inferior.”²¹ Partially because of this, Avicenna made a radical departure from the thinking of his two most influential predecessors, focusing his thought and studies on the metaphysical rather than physical questions of existence. As a result, kalām began to assimilate Arabic falsafa and became a truly *Islamic* philosophy- a synthesis of Avicenna’s metaphysics and Muslim doctrine. He became the central figure in the history of Arabic-Islamic philosophy, and his metaphysical philosophical contributions concerning the existence of the human rational soul, the distinction between essence and existence, and the existence of God were debated, “from both the mainstream Sunnī and smaller Shī’a branches of Islam right up to the advent of Islamic modernism at the end of the nineteenth century.”²²

The focus of these debates concerned metaphysical problems, yet Avicenna remained true to the application of reason and the practice of logical inquiry and discourse due to his dedication to the Western theories and teachings of Aristotle. His logical thesis that only the rational human soul survives death, and his denial of bodily resurrection, is rarely openly accepted by Muslim thinkers entrenched in religious prophesy and dogma, “given the Qur’an’s crystal-clear description of the physical pains and pleasures that await us in the afterlife.”²³ Of the four key philosophers from the formative period of Arab-Islamic philosophy, it was Avicenna’s logical thoughts and practices, attempting to harmonize philosophy with religion and logos with mythos, which had the most direct and lasting impact.

Averroes, last of the four most influential classical Arabic thinkers, believed that truths established through philosophical reason are useful for rectifying theological excesses resulting

²¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 300.

²² Robert Wisnovsky, “Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 92-3.

²³ Ibid, 114.

from dogmatic interpretation of scriptural prophecies. He insisted that the identical truths of religion and philosophy can be determined through application of logic and reason. Yet the difficult philosophical route to truth is favorable to a select few, whereas religious truth is taught to the masses:

The religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory, since they lead toward wisdom in a way universal to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain number of intelligent people to the knowledge of happiness, and they therefore have to learn wisdom, whereas religions seek the instruction of the masses generally.²⁴

Averroes insisted that the purpose of religion is to educate human beings in morality and proper human behavior to ensure they follow a reasoned route to personal fulfillment and happiness. However, “no school of Averroist thought arose in the Arabic tradition to continue his work, perhaps because of his failure to gain favor for his philosophically driven analysis of religious issues.”²⁵

When retracing the path forged by these four Arab-Islamic thinkers, a shift in both the theory and practice of Arab-Islamic philosophy becomes evident. The twelfth century saw the apotheosis of pure religious philosophy and prophesy, and the decline of kalām. Falsafa- the Greek-based form of philosophical inquiry- became increasingly condemned by religious scholars and clerics. Falsafa slowly merged with the sophisticated Islamic philosophical theology of kalām and eventually embodied Sufism. By the thirteenth century, the doors of Islamic schools were closed, and the writings of the Qur’an became accepted as revelation and uncontested by human reason. This negative shift is well-demonstrated through the utterances of Ibn al-Salāh in 1245 A.D., which openly condemned the application of logic:

²⁴ Richard C. Taylor, “Averroes: Religious Dialectic and Aristotelian Philosophical Thought,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 187.

²⁵ Ibid, 196.

As far as logic is concerned, it is a means of access to philosophy. Now the access to something bad is also bad. Preoccupation with the study and teaching of logic has not been permitted by the Lawgiver. The use of the terminology of logic in the investigation of religious law is despicable and one of the recently introduced follies. Thank God, the laws of religion are not in need of logic.²⁶

Mythos predominated logos, and unquestioned religious dogma became the universally recognized and enforced source of truth:

The unbound reason of Greek philosophy, which would grant primacy to reason over revelation, was attacked by al-Ghazali and then by a host of lesser figures, leading to the hard blow dealt by Ibn Taymiyya in his *Refutation of the Rationalists*.²⁷

The study and practice of logic as Westerners understand the term did not discontinue by 1300 A.D., but religious subjugation, coupled with the Crusades, did much to impede its further progress until the advent of the postcolonial Islamic world. The intellectual tension and struggle between Arab-Islamic theologians and philosophers ended in an overwhelming and enduring victory of mythos over logos, which contributed greatly to the entrenchment and isolation of Arab-Islamic thinking for over five hundred years. Post-classical Arab-Islamic philosophers became divided into two main categories according to their religious affiliation with the Sunnī and Shīʿa Islamic sects, and the teaching of *hikmat* or *hikmah*- those who reject Islam are rejecting wisdom- propagated to epidemic proportions. This intellectual reversal occurred during the same period of Western history which witnessed the end of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution- major events which could not have occurred without an open embrace of logic and reason.

²⁶ Tony Street, "Logic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 253.

²⁷ Hossein Zai, "Recent Trends in Arabic and Persian Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 413.

For the Ottoman Empire, the only Western achievements worthy of attention during this era of great transformation encompassed the techniques and implements of war. The evolving languages, literatures, arts, and philosophies of the West remained of little interest or relevance to the Arab-Islamic world, and were influences to be resisted following the decline of the ‘Sick Man’ of Europe and the penetration of European colonialism.²⁸ This included resisting the reintroduction of logic and reason into philosophical and theological discourse. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792 A.D.), the founder of Wahhabism, fostered this opposition to encroachment of un-Islamic ideas and practices, ultimately aiming to excise all Western “innovations” and force a “return to guidance by the Qur’an and the hadith.”²⁹ Interestingly, he emphasized the importance of *ijtihad*- independent rational judgment- as a counterweight to Western influence- indicating that throughout this period of Arab-Islamic public retraction of logical practices, the concept of logos remained influential. In the 1820s, the modernizing ruler Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt reinstituted the translating of Western literary works through the printing press established in Cairo, furthering an underground resurgence of Western logic and reason.³⁰

However, the wide-spread awakening of Arab-Islamic interest in Western logic and reason remains largely resisted due to perceptions of unwanted moral encroachment and political illegitimacy. The writings of Sayyid Qutb, the influential Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist executed by Gamal’abd al-Nasr in 1966, whose theoretical work influenced the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, assert:

²⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 159.

²⁹ Lawrence E. Cahoon, *Cultural Revolutions: Reason Versus Culture in Philosophy, Politics, and Jihad* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 187.

³⁰ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 170.

The natural condition of the universe is thus one of peace and harmony of humans with nature, humans with other humans, humans with their own beings. What distinguishes human beings from other creatures is their ability to intuit this central, indivisible truth. The intuition comes from the soul, located somewhere deep within human nature beyond the reaches of human reason.³¹

The history of Arab-Islamic thinking and philosophy is replete with examples of an ongoing tension between logos and mythos. Logos has never been completely eliminated from the Arab-Islamic psyche, despite intense theological and political repression. This allows for the assertion that logical thought- universal and unchanging in its application- can be applied when evaluating the motivations of both sides of the current tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds. The fact that Arab-Islamic thinking is rooted- consciously and sub-consciously- in classic Greek thought, and that both sides have endured various historical periods where mythos largely outweighed logos, reinforces this claim of similarity. Thomas Hobbes was interested in many forms of epistemology, yet became intellectually satisfied when he was able to demonstrate that using ontology, sensation, and reason allowed for accurate perceptions of reality.³² John Locke asserted that philosophy “must not presume to inquire into realms that cannot be explored by the well-tried scientific methods of observation and induction, comparison and experiment.”³³ However, Hobbes and Locke were dedicated empiricists due to their belief that form and content of knowledge is “found in the immediacy of perception.”³⁴ Both felt it necessary to employ religious mythos and sophist rhetoric to varying extents to ensure that their logical thoughts and teachings were assimilated by as large a proportion of the British population

³¹ Robert D. Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity- The Search for Islamic Authenticity* (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1997), 98-9.

³² George Boas, *Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy* (New York: The Roland Press Company, 1957), 184.

³³ E. W. F. Tomlin, *The Great Philosophers of the Western World* (New York: A. A. Wyn, Inc., 1952), 168.

³⁴ Boas, George, *Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy* (New York: The Roland Press Company, 1957), 200.

as possible. As during the classical Arab-Islamic period, the majority of the British population relied on religious teachings and rhetoric to gain epistemological knowledge, and political institutions utilized this dependency to influence the ongoing tension between mythos and logos and motivate the population toward extreme acts.

Similar epistemological tensions concerning truth and belief, logos and mythos, and the physical and metaphysical worlds have been present in both Western and Arab-Islamic thought since at least the seventh century A.D. The patterns of thinking and methods of inquiry utilized by both sides have been largely identical, although the foci of inquiry and conclusions drawn have sometimes been different. Political, social, and religious motivations have largely accounted for the divergences in intellectual thought and motivation, *not* the ability to reason and apply logic. Given these premises, an initial conclusion appears that the potential exists for intellectual application of both Thomas Hobbes' and John Locke's logical political theories to determine the source of today's tension between the Western and Islamic worlds. To reinforce the theory that their philosophies apply, it must next be determined whether the same forms of political, social, and religious pressures existed in both seventeenth century Great Britain and today in the twenty-first century.

Differing States of Nature and Acceptance of Sovereignty

Of critical importance is the implicit conflict which exists between the teachings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679 A.D.) and John Locke (1632-1704 A.D.). Although developed nearly four hundred years ago amid a period of intense strife and conflict, both theories apply equally well in describing today's tension between the West and Islam. Both periods exhibit similarities in thought and political, social, and religious context. In seventeenth century Great Britain, there existed a complex array of political, social, and religious problems involving multiple protagonists vying for legitimacy, power, and influence. The monarchy, led by King Charles I, was in direct competition with Parliament for political control, with the King usurping Parliament and shutting it down on several occasions for years at a time when his authority was challenged. Ultimately, the Protestant Oliver Cromwell formed an army- known as the "roundheads" and independent of the King- and fought the Royalists to re-institute Parliament as the supreme authority of the land and reduce the King's role from that of an absolute monarch to a simple executive and figurehead. This violent period, now known as the Reformation, culminated in the overthrow of King Charles I and his eventual public execution in 1648. Thomas Hobbes- an eventual Royalist and proponent of strong central authority- had been a direct witness to much of this struggle, and the knowledge he gained drove him to create his influential work *Leviathan* in 1651. The general public's intense fear concerning how their safety and security would be assured- fears fueled by routine graphic atrocities committed by both sides of the political conflict which perpetuated a growing lack of faith in government- provided the genesis for his realistic thinking.³⁵ This fear and mistrust spread rapidly throughout society, with the poor assailing the rich, soldiers assailing their officers, citizens attacking authority figures and

³⁵ Simon Schama, "Revolutions (1649-1689)," in *A History of Britain- The Complete DVD Collection* (British Broadcasting Company; New York: The History Channel, 2002), episode elapsed time- 01:40.

structures, etc. It was from these conditions that Hobbes developed his theory concerning man's violent state of nature.

The lack of legitimacy and uncontested authority shared by both the monarchy and parliament became coupled with the ongoing religious tension between Catholicism and the growing ranks of Puritan extremists- each side contending for influence over the Protestant majority. Each side viewed the opposition as signifying intolerance, oppression, excess, and illegitimacy, and the mistrust led to open conflict at all levels- from armies engaged in open warfare to smaller religious sects (such as the Gideons and Calvinists) engaged in unconventional attacks and other forms of subversion. The ongoing religious tension within the church became a motivator utilized by political authorities to incite further violence in support of underlying political objectives. This manipulative practice is best observed through Oliver Cromwell's open references to religious scripture and use of the Parliamentary army- "the Protestant Taliban"- ³⁶ to impose religious law to subvert Royalist and Catholic uprisings. His later creation of a temporary, hand-picked theocratic protectorate based on piety further exemplifies the fusion of political objectives with religious rhetoric. Manipulation of existing religious allegiances is also evident throughout the period of the Restoration in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Following Cromwell's death, the period was defined by the re-instatement of the monarchy under Charles II and the use of Catholicism to motivate revenge acts in retribution for his father's earlier execution- "the Hanging of the King-Killers". ³⁷

This century of political and social tension, permeated with conflicting religious affiliations, came largely to a close in Great Britain with the imposition of a foreign ruler assisted both by an exhausted, war-weary British public and the impressive Dutch Armada. However,

³⁶ Ibid, episode elapsed time- 25:59.

³⁷ Ibid, episode elapsed time- 35:01.

King William of Orange and Queen Mary of Stuart lineage were far more amenable to the restrictions on their authority demanded by Parliament, creating favorable conditions for representative rule and public and private commerce. It was this eventual change of political and social conditions that inspired John Locke to pen his *Second Treatise of Government* in 1690, which also presented theories of the state of nature and legitimate sovereignty. Locke had witnessed many of the same conditions present throughout seventeenth century Great Britain, yet the theories he developed are largely in opposition to those developed by Hobbes.

Hobbes and Locke both lived during this period of intense political, social, and religious strife in Great Britain, and their philosophies developed from comparable experiences based on empirical evidence. Yet they are couched within two different schools of thought. Hobbes, witness to abhorrently violent conflict between Royalist supporters of Kings Charles I and dissenters led by Oliver Cromwell and his Parliamentary army, is now recognized as a key member of the Realist and Materialist schools of thought. He believed that the fundamental states of man and nature could not be changed, and asserted that it was necessary to develop political institutions and laws to force human nature toward compliance and positive action to ensure the public's safety and security.³⁸ Additionally:

His philosophy had to be based on reason, not on religious revelation; and his method had to be as close as possible to the method employed by geometry...for Hobbes the rejection of all information that was not gained through human senses and reason alone; that is, any knowledge gained from someone else's authority, especially that gained from purportedly supernatural sources, was not to be trusted.³⁹

In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes insists that ungoverned man exists in a perpetual state of nature earmarked by conflict and war due to each individual's inherently equal abilities and

³⁸ Laurie Bagby, *Political Thought- A Guide to the Classics* (Canada: Wadsworth Group, 2002), 47.

³⁹ Laurie Bagby, *Political Thought- A Guide to the Classics* (Canada: Wadsworth Group, 2002), 70.

perceived rights to power, pleasure, property and liberty. This problem is compounded by each individual's differing opinions and perspectives:

From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies and in their way to that end destroy or subdue one another.⁴⁰

Hobbes lists three primary causes of conflict: Competition, diffidence and glory, with man utilizing violence as the primary means to achieve their personal ends. He claims that due to this constant state of conflict present in the state of nature, quality of life improvements are impossible, for there is no recognized leadership or state, and the prophesies and benefits of pursuing a favorable afterlife are not provable based on logic and reason. Individuals live in a constant state of fear of violence and death, and the life of man is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."⁴¹ Notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice prove irrelevant toward alleviating the difficulties caused by the nature of man, and Hobbes asserts, "Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice."⁴² To improve this situation, Hobbes argues that the masses must renounce or transfer perceived individual rights to an uncontested higher authority in exchange for life, security and prosperity: "Men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all."⁴³ By entering into this agreement, or "social contract", citizens must readily accept the decisions of the ruler as just and for the public good, and must never revolt so that social chaos can be avoided. The form or character of this uncontested authority was irrelevant in Hobbes' eyes, provided that the sovereign could continually guarantee the safety and security of the public, and

⁴⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Idaho: University of Idaho)
<http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hobbes%20Leviathan/FIRST.txt>

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

would remain willing to apply any means necessary to quash dissenters. Theological beliefs and ethical judgments should remain secondary, if not irrelevant in maintaining social order. When allowed to propagate, these beliefs can lead civil strife and violence unabated:

Men must therefore fear death as the greatest evil. The fear of invisible powers, however, leads them to believe that powers exist that are capable of inflicting a greater evil than death and of bestowing a greater reward than the preservation of life. It leads them to believe in the existence of incorporeal substances and hence in the possibility of eternal damnation, thereby rendering them unfit for civil life. "For no man can serve two masters; nor is he less but rather more a master, whom we believe we are to obey for fear of damnation, than he whom we obey for fear of temporal death." Hobbes thus seeks the removal of such fears: "If this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away... men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience." Far from agreeing with the traditional view that the good society depends on religious belief, Hobbes's political theory rests on the principle that the popular fear of any power higher than the civil authority is destructive of society itself. Piety subverts society.⁴⁴

Today's Western practice of secularism appears to adopt this philosophy, and has proven to be in direct opposition to Arab-Islamic ideology. Additionally, the modern nation-state, readily recognized as the ultimate institution of authority in the West, appears to contain many of the characteristics of Hobbes' *Leviathan*, often operating under precepts such as national defense, regional and global stability, and free enterprise.

Locke's philosophy, identified as liberalist in nature, stands contrary to Hobbes' ideas and assertions. The contrast lies specifically with regard to the state of nature and legitimacy of the sovereign. Whereas Hobbes advocates accepting unopposed political order to ensure self-preservation and avoid a return to the violent state of nature, Locke asserts that the state of nature

⁴⁴ Jan H. Blits, "Hobbesian Fear, Political Theory," *An International Journal of Political Philosophy* Volume 17, Number 3 (August 1989): 426-27.

is a state of liberty and equality, with social contracts being voluntarily established only to maintain the individual rights present within the state of nature: ⁴⁵

The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. ⁴⁶

Contrary to Hobbes' call for mass subjugation to an unchallengeable human authority, Locke states that "there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours." Rather, Locke maintains a 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you' approach in order to maintain social control through self-governance- evidenced by his claim, "the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation." ⁴⁷ Also a social contract theorist, Locke asserts that social order is maintained through the establishment of accepted laws and the election of legislative and judicial bodies, working with the best interests of all at the forefront, and guided by reason and theological principles. However, he differs from Hobbes by asserting that humans would rather live with no government than be subjected to tyranny, perceived or actual. Therefore, he argues, "any legitimate government rests upon the consent of, or contract with, the governed." ⁴⁸ It is important to note

⁴⁵ Peter M. R. Stirk and David Weigal, *An Introduction to Political Ideas* (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1995), 23-4.

⁴⁶ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* (Idaho: University of Idaho) <http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/Locke%202nd%20ToC.htm>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Laurie Bagby, *Political Thought- A Guide to the Classics* (Canada: Wadsworth Group, 2002),

that both theorists agree that governmental authority, regardless of its form and function, must enjoy acceptance by the people to remain legitimate.

Recognizing that both Hobbes and Locke were social contract theorists, their differing viewpoints can be brought to bear in analyzing how Arab Islamic and Western societies currently organize themselves politically, socially and religiously. The two historical contexts share both similarities and differences between, perceived states of nature, and public willingness to accept unopposed sovereignty. A comparative analysis details the prevailing political, social, and religious conditions underlying the current tension to pull forth similarities with seventeenth century Great Britain and reinforce claims of relative applicability for both Hobbes' and Locke's theories. Additionally, references to current literary works and statements made by various key players on both sides of the tension reinforce assertions of applicability.

Several similarities exist between the social, political, and religious conditions present both between the antagonists in seventeenth century Great Britain and today in the twenty-first century. Some differences exist, such as a presence or lack of homogenous societies, persuasive external actors, economic interdependencies, and instantaneous global information conduits. Yet the similarities between the two periods far outweigh the differences, and provide more than adequate evidence with which to assert that Hobbes' and Locke's theories apply and are being exercised. To begin with, today's political tension largely resembles the political confrontation witnessed between the aristocratic and parliamentary forms of government in Great Britain. Nationalistic and authoritarian governments throughout the Middle East, at times employing brutal practices to subjugate their populations, are in direct conflict with unrelenting desires for autonomy and equal representation at the local tribal and familial levels. Add to this tension the perceived interventionist activities of the U.S. and her Western allies, and the situation takes on a global nature and becomes even more convoluted and dire. Unwanted, externally-imposed forms of governmental authority remain illegitimate in the eyes of local populations, and like the political tension experienced in Great Britain, resolution comes only through violent resistance.

Marina Ottaway, in her book titled *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*, asserts that, like the final imposition of foreign rule on the British people following over one hundred years of exhaustive internal turmoil:

States have been armed and enlarged through conquest, international treaties that imposed settlements on the defeated, and colonial undertakings. They have never been formed peacefully, by democratic leaders through processes of consultation. The concept of democratic state formation is an idea of the 1990s without a historical precedent...The keys to state formation were war and violence, and the democratization of the state was a subsequent development achieved through a considerable amount of political strife.⁴⁹

Whereas Western societies have willingly accepted the necessity for large nation-state political organizations governed by the rule of law to maintain security and order, Arab-Islamic societies remain wedded to smaller and more basic forms of social organization- namely tribal and familial in nature:

Political identities tended to be drawn instead either from one's religious affiliation or one's local kin group...many of the states in the Middle East today...were not willed into existence by their own people or developed organically out of a common historical memory or ethnic or linguistic bond; they also did not emerge out of a social contract between rulers and ruled.⁵⁰

Political corruption and a desire for centrist governments to maintain their power and influence have prevented efforts to re-draw unrealistic nation-state boundaries which remain contested. This tendency conforms more to Locke's envisioned state of nature, where only limited forms of government are acceptable over anarchy. Authority is recognized as required, and is maintained through tribal chiefs for secular matters, and Imams and Islamic scholars for matters of religion. Even when attempting to follow democratic principles, Arab-Islamic societies largely prefer to constrain their practices to open deliberation (*sharwa*) to maintain a

⁴⁹ Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 172-73.

⁵⁰ Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1995), 98-99.

sense of individual identity and authenticity.⁵¹ Additionally, Hobbes' social contract theory falls into direct conflict with the religious underpinnings of Islam, for consent to be governed can not be achieved or maintained "if too many were concerned to promote particular religious views."⁵² In Islamic society where, theologically, God- Allah- is the only true (and non-physical) sovereign, this presents a serious dilemma.⁵³

While the Western world exists within the framework of largely uncontested covenants or social contracts in recognition of Hobbes' view of the inherently violent state of nature, the Islamic world exists largely within Locke's state of nature, organized around smaller, independent social and political organizations based on tribal and familial allegiances, rooted in Bedouin identity and Islamic theology, and largely unwilling to accept outside intervention and authority. Issues concerning safety and security have traditionally been dealt with locally at the tribal levels, and wide-spread animosity exists toward any tendency to abdicate authority to a higher sovereign. Raphael Patai, in his oft-cited book *The Arab Mind*, refers to a series of concentric social circles to describe the Arab-Islamic sociopolitical world view and tendencies toward allegiance. The tribe, village, and kin predominate, followed much later by outside political organizations such as the nation-state. Political entities holding the least amount of sway in the Arab-Islamic world are, "the speakers of all other tongues whatever their religious persuasion."⁵⁴

⁵¹ Kemal H. Karpat, *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Prager Publishers, 2nd ed., 1982), 38.

⁵² Russell Hardin, "Hobbesian Political Order," *Political Theory- An International Journal of Political Philosophy* Volume 19, Number 2 (May 1991): 157.

⁵³ Shireen T. Hunter, *The Future of Islam and the West- Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence?* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), 33.

⁵⁴ Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), 44-5.

According to Patai, the Bedouin is, “a rugged individualist who refuses to bend to authority,” and he, “has no patience left for any discipline imposed by outside authority.”⁵⁵ In fact, even up to the times following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, “one of the most incomprehensible of Western institutions for the Muslim observer was the elected representative assembly.”⁵⁶ Nation-state boundaries, predominantly established in the Middle East following the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, were largely foreign to its indigenous populations, and therefore held limited influence in societal matters. Historically, sovereignty in the Middle East resided with the wielder of power, much more in tune with Hobbes’ philosophy, and this power was rarely challenged for the sake of preserving the social order.⁵⁷

Yet the concept of a representative republic is not unfamiliar to the Arab-Islamic world. Medieval Arabic translations of Greek political writings are replete with references to terms such as *politeia*- polity or commonwealth- defined by the Arabic term *madina*, and Plato’s “democratic polity” appears in classical Arabic texts as *madina jama'iyya*. The original Sunni jurists even went as far as to formulate political laws to ensure that the caliphate remained a nonhereditary, elective office, subject to and not above the law. Yet during and after the first four caliphs, sovereignty in Islam assumed a monarchical form.⁵⁸ The resulting battle over representative succession between Sunnī and Shī'a Islam, which continues to this day, in some respects mirrors the Royalist-Parliamentarian/ Catholic-Protestant struggle evident in seventeenth century Great Britain. The tension arose over the Prophet Muhammad’s succession following his death in 632

⁵⁵ Ibid, 81-2.

⁵⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 215.

⁵⁷ Alan R. Taylor, *The Islamic Question in Middle East Politics* (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 120.

⁵⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 210.

AD. The Shi'a sect supported Muhammad's direct lineage through his cousin and son-in-law 'Alī, and was eventually known as the "Party of 'Ali." However, Abū Bakr- supported by the Sunnis who demanded more elective representation- became the prophet's successor as head of state, or *caliph*. The Shī'a, with their Royalist desires to ensure that political power was retained by Muhammad's direct descendents, coupled with their differing religious practices, were largely repressed for several hundred years.⁵⁹

However, the eventual expulsion of colonialism and the resolution of the Cold War reduced the perceived need for large governmental control. In many instances a lack of legitimacy based on such issues as state intrusion into everyday life, perceived external domination, cultural and social changes⁶⁰ resulted in an increase in "multiple definitions of national identity," and a "descent into illiberal populism."⁶¹ With this comes a decline of political order, a further dependence on tribal and familial affiliations, and increased opportunities for Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. These results are based upon "the imperative of legitimacy, arguing that the turn to Islamization was a reactive policy- a type of survival strategy- to protect the state from serious challenges to its authority."⁶² At times, Islamization is seen as a legitimate method of challenge against a state apparatus perceived to be illegitimate, and these challenges can originate internally from within a particular Islamic society, or they can be external in nature.

⁵⁹ Robert Wisnovsky, "Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 94.

⁶⁰ Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation- Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2nd ed. 2003), 118.

⁶¹ Mohammad Ayoob, "The Muslim World's Poor Record of Modernization and Democratization: The Interplay of External and Internal Factors," in *Modernization, Democracy, and Islam*, ed. Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 191.

⁶² Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan- Islam and the Making of State Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7.

Gilles DeLeuze and Felix Guattari, addressing *The War Machine*, or a state-sponsored military apparatus utilized in an oppressive manner to subjugate a population and maintain order, expound upon this ongoing phenomena. They assert that modes of state sovereignty can only control and rule what they capable of internalizing and influencing. This assertion holds true at the local, nation-state, and global levels. Legitimacy is required, and large governments which habitually rely on military means to enforce control routinely lose their legitimacy. Tribes and other such groups which refuse to be subjected to state sovereignty remain exterior to the state, and indicate a “neoprimitivism, a new tribal society”- nomadism.⁶³ Addressing the nomadic tendency to resist the sovereignty of the state yet remain elusive to attack and submission, DeLeuze and Guattari insist that a fundamental difference exists between Western and Eastern (Arab-Islamic) thinking. Revolutions occur in the Western world with the goal of transforming yet maintaining state sovereignty to prevent a decent into Hobbes’ state of nature, whereas revolutions which occur in the Eastern world- or, more specifically, the Islamic world- occur with “the destruction, the abolition of the State” in mind to maintain the individual rights guaranteed in a Lockean state of nature.⁶⁴ In either case, the revolt is a direct result of a desire for self-determination, a principle tenet expressed in the state of nature espoused by John Locke. Without perceived and actual authority, a Leviathan-style War Machine will always be resisted by rhizomatic, nomadic groups and organizations utilizing any and all means necessary.

Forms of religious tension present today between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds also somewhat mirror those present in seventeenth century Great Britain, although the forms of religious belief and the political and social parties involved differ. The authoritarian Anglican church and radical yet representative Puritans in Great Britain were vying for power and

⁶³ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus- Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 360.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 385.

influence over the moderate Protestant majority. All sides would invoke religious fervor to incite both armies and otherwise peaceful individuals to act beyond standards of accepted morality and conduct barbarous acts of violence to assist in quelling political opposition. Today, secularists and Islamic fundamentalists are competing for control over the moderate Muslim majority, utilizing fear, intimidation, and Islamic *fatwas* to garner support and incite insurrection. Internal differences also exist between the authoritarian means demanded within the current Shī'a- Sunnī split, much like the tension between the Anglican and Catholic churches in the seventeenth century. Countless references can be cited proclaiming that the tension and struggle is purely religious in nature, yet in each case the political entities involved have disingenuously utilized and manipulated religious faith to obtain political legitimacy for heinous acts representing both subjugation and rebellion. Nationalistic and religious desires have been repeatedly utilized to inflame passion, and although differences remain within the comparison of historic and current contexts, this fact remains a constant. Although deeply steeped in mythos, religion has been applied in a carefully thought out manner, indicating the prevalence of calculated logos within the thinking of all antagonists involved. Reconciling religion and reason, and decoupling religion from politics, appears today at times to be an impossible task for both sides. Logic and reason are still studied in Islamic institutions, but under a theological rather than philosophical precept. Similarities exist, but are largely buried due to opposing rhetoric. Add to this a dispute over recognized forms of legitimate sovereignty, and a recipe for disaster results.

Intervention vs. Insurgency- a Perpetual Cycle of Violence

We fight not to enslave, but to set a country free, and to make room upon the earth for honest men to live.

-Thomas Paine ⁶⁵

Allah said, 'He who attacked you, attack him as he attacked you,' and also, 'The reward of evil is a similar evil,' and also, 'When you are punished, punish as you have been punished.

-Suleiman Abu Gheith; Al-Qa'ida spokesman ⁶⁶

The two quotes above signify the differences in ideology expressed by current U.S. Administration officials in advocating the preemptive actions in the Middle East and the resulting insurgency being conducted by Islamic extremists. These two ideologies can be easily identified with the theories presented by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke- both in context and in the tension evident between the philosophies expressed by each. In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes states in *The Second part of the Commonwealth*- Chapter XVII: Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth, that:

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. ⁶⁷

This statement, at outward appearance seeming to advocate the existence and use of a strong military force to maintain peace and social harmony, proves somewhat contrary to the assertions of John Locke in his *Second Treatises of Government*. In Book II: An Essay

⁶⁵ Scott Shore, comment on "Why We Fight," The IntellectualConservative Blog, Accessed 12 FEB 2007, <http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article2252.html>

⁶⁶ Suleiman Abu Gheith, comment on "Why We Fight America," The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 388, posted 12 June 2002, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP38802>

⁶⁷ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Idaho: University of Idaho) <http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hobbes%20Leviathan/FIRST.txt>

Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, Chapter XVI: Of Conquest-
he states:

Many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any government, as demolishing a house is from building a new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for a new frame of common-wealth, by destroying the former; but; without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.

And,

He that forces my horse from me, ought presently to restore him, and I have still a right to retake him.⁶⁸

While Hobbes appears to advocate the use of unchallenged force to ensure (or restore) peace, maintain legitimacy, and prevent diffidence or insecurity, Locke appears to refute its application for such means and instead encourages dissent (if not insurgency) against such measures. The current tension and conflict between Western and Arab-Islamic societies is rooted in differing perceptions of legitimate sovereignty, recognized as:

A right to issue a command and, because the command is rightfully issued, citizens are under an obligation to obey. However, shorn of this association with right, we lose the ability to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate power, between authority and sheer might.⁶⁹

By applying both theories on a global scale in an attempt to identify which proves more relevant today, one can determine that these respective theories are perceived to be equally justified as exercised by the associated sides of the tension and conflict, and just as the two philosophers' theories directly oppose one another, their direct application has spurred a perpetual cycle of violence. *The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS) clearly describes the paradoxical change in thinking concerning U.S. national security

⁶⁸ John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* (Idaho: University of Idaho)
<http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/ToC/Locke%202nd%20ToC.htm>

⁶⁹ Peter M. R. Stirk and David Weigal, *An Introduction to Political Ideas* (London: Pinter Publishers Limited, 1995), 39.

policy following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Up until the attacks, emerging post-Cold War thinking and argument began to assert that domestic issues would prove to be the primary new threats to our security. Yet now international terrorism is regarded as the primary threat to the security of the United States, and the document describes several measures and responsibilities necessary to defeat that threat. The document recognizes, “the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology” and, “the only path to peace and security is the path of action”. Contrary to the perception of many, the 2002 NSS asserts, “we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom.”⁷⁰ Additionally, the 2002 NSS states, “our best defense is a good offense”, and Stephen Nathanson, an ethics and political philosophy professor at Northeastern University, effectively associates this assertion with Hobbes’ philosophy:

(According to Hobbes), in (the state of nature), because people recognize that they are in competition with one another for life’s necessities, they come to see that they threaten one another, and this provides them with another motive for conflict. This is the motive of fear or suspicion that Hobbes calls “diffidence.” One person (A) might attack another (B) not to gain B’s goods but rather to prevent B from attacking A. This motive is essentially the logic behind preemptive attacks and the idea that “the best defense is a good offense.”⁷¹

The 2002 NSS document signifies the final break from lingering Cold War American thinking and attitudes concerning perceived threats and American foreign policy.⁷² Whereas in the recent past terrorist threats were perceived as internal in origin, now they are viewed as external threats to the world as a whole. Recognizing that America plays a key role in the global community, and is directly influenced by negative nation-states and events, “America will hold to

⁷⁰ “National Security Strategy of the United States, The 2002/2006,” accessed 12 FEB 2007, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html

⁷¹ Stephen Nathanson, *Should We Consent to be Governed?- A Short Introduction to Political Philosophy* (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1992), 73.

⁷² John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 85-6.

account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists- because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.”⁷³ The document lists several multilateral or unilateral economic, social, structural and ideological actions the U.S. will take to counter those threats. However, the primary impetus remains on the ability and willingness to intervene with preemptive military force to maintain order and enforce international agreements and resolutions. William Norman Grigg explains this transformation well in his article titled *Why We Fight*: “Since 9-11, Americans have been incessantly told that on that terrible morning, ‘everything changed,’ and that in the post-September 11 world we must act ‘preemptively’ to disarm Saddam and other rulers who defy the UN’s rule.”⁷⁴ This corresponds directly to the ideology presented by Thomas Hobbes, and is the direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which immediately called into question the level of safety and security enjoyed by the American public. Thomas P.M. Barnett, a renowned author and key advisor to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, targets Arab-Islamic political and religious practices throughout the Middle East as the source of that insecurity. With glaring clarity and direct reference to Hobbes, he states, “the only thing that will change that nasty environment and open the floodgates for change is if some external power steps in and plays Leviathan full time.”⁷⁵

However, this position has been evolving within the American psyche over the last four decades. In Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield’s 1962 State Department-commissioned study titled *A World Effectively Controlled by the United Nations*, he describes a desirable system where “a national government could be charged with ‘aggression’ without violating the borders of another nation-state, or even threatening to do so. A nation could commit this supposed offense simply

⁷³ “National Security Strategy of the United States, The 2002/2006,” accessed 12 FEB 2007, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>

⁷⁴ William Norman Grigg, commenting on “Why We Fight,” accessed on 06 DEC 2004, http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2003/04-21-2003/vol19no08_fight.htm

⁷⁵ Ibid.

through overt repudiation of the new order and the political system representing it.”⁷⁶ Given the long-standing state of conflict and tension between Iraq and the United States concerning Saddam Hussein’s open defiance, and past unwillingness of several United Nations General Assembly and Security Council members to enforce resolutions, President George W. Bush openly embraced Hobbes’ *Leviathan* approach. He stated, “the United States and its coalition partners are ready and willing to enforce the just demands of the world.”⁷⁷

Some Americans believe, “There is no cause for them to attack us. We have done nothing to them. We have not tried to provoke them, to convert them, to conquer them- we have given them no cause.”⁷⁸ However, in reference to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Al-Qa’ida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith refutes this argument:

What happened to America is something natural, an expected event for a country that uses terror, arrogant policy, and suppression against the nations and peoples, and imposes a single method, thought, and way of life, as if the people of the entire world are clerks in its government and employed by its commercial companies and institutions.⁷⁹

In short, the impression held by many Muslims in the Arab-Islamic world of the United States (and of Western powers since the 12th and 13th century Crusades) is as an illegitimate aggressor nation focused on instituting a new world order in favor of its own self interests and at the perceived expense of their ways of life and beliefs. Many insist that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an inevitable and a necessary means to resist American hegemony- adopting yet grossly exaggerating the ideology presented by Locke. They credit years of Western economic sanctions and military intervention throughout the Middle East (to include the overt support of Israel) as

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ “Why We Fight This War,” Eminentmen.com Blog, accessed 12 FEB 2007, <http://www.eminentmen.com/whyWar.htm>

⁷⁹ Suleiman Abu Gheith, comment on “Why We Fight America,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 388, posted 12 June 2002, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP38802>

unjustified and unchecked acts of Leviathan-style aggression, and claim, “we have the right to resist...Armed resistance is not an aberration from the norm.”⁸⁰ Many view U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan as a springboard method to impose pro-Western imperialist policies throughout the Middle East:

Our Arab and Muslim nation will face new crusades that aim to deprive us of our homeland, doctrine and dignity. Insistence on waging a war against Iraq is nothing but a beginning of a series of attacks directed to the rest of the Arab world. This is evidenced by the declaration of anti-Islamic forces to the effect that once Iraq is subdued, the situation in the Arab region will be rearranged in favor of U.S. and Israeli interests.⁸¹

Finally, many Arab Islamic scholars believe that the only way to subdue America’s perceived Leviathan-style interventionist activities is through use of reciprocating force and violence. Undoubtedly, those feelings form part of the catalyst for the ongoing insurgency against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq:

America knows only the language of force. This is the only way to stop it and make it take its hands off the Muslims and their affairs. America does not know the language of dialogue!! Or the language of peaceful coexistence!! America is kept at bay by blood alone...⁸²

Interpretations of Islamic religious fundamentalism, used to perpetuate violent extremist resistance, also fuel this Hobbes vs. Locke cycle of violence. Many scholars in the United States and the rest of the Western world recognize that Arab-Islamic culture and religious beliefs center around the notion that theirs is a struggle- *jihad*- filled with aspirations of martyrdom, against

⁸⁰ Adam Pashut, comment on “Dr. Assam Al-Tamimi: A Political-Ideological Brief,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 163, posted 19 February 2004, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16304>

⁸¹ Steven Stalinski, comment on “Leading Egyptian Islamic Clerics on Jihad Against U.S. Troops in Iraq: March-August 2003,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 145, posted 14 August 2003, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA14503>

⁸² Suleiman Abu Gheith, comment on “Why We Fight America,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Special Dispatch Series No. 388, posted 12 June 2002, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP38802>

internal and external Western infidels— claims that are not unfounded in fact. Therefore, the common belief held by many Americans remains that “any individual extremist will not stop until that day when he gets to kill a large number of people and die at the same time. We must therefore kill that individual first.”⁸³ References to the use of suicide bombers, kidnappings, ambushes, ground and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and unguided rocket attacks against organizations and governments perceived as pro-Western, all at the continuing expense of their fellow Muslim citizens, fuel Western assertions that Hobbes’ ideology holds certain truth.

Reciprocally, many Islamic scholars and clerics do not refute these religious beliefs and practices, and claim that their struggle is against the imposition of Western culture and values upon their core beliefs and desires for autonomy. In fact, assertions are common that political extremist groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Lebanese Hezbollah are gaining support throughout the region through their willingness to openly oppose U.S., Israeli, and coalition forces on the grounds of Arab-Islamic fundamentalism. Dr. Azzam Al-Tamimi- an executive member of the Muslims Association of Britain and known Hamas member- claims:

Islam is Hamas’ ideological frame of reference...Such an outlook renders struggle a religious duty, not a nationalist or patriotic one. In other words, defending the land and honor of the Muslims is an act of worship for which God rewards a struggler in the form of victory in this life and eternity in Gardens of Eden in the life after death...⁸⁴

Further, Locke’s ideology of resistance is routinely taught as a part of Islamic ideology, albeit not consciously. All Muslims, regardless of age or gender, are expected to participate in the struggle to expel perceived illegitimate invaders no matter the cost, and by any means necessary. This is clearly witnessed by the statements of Dr. Ahmad Al-Tayeb- moderate Grand

⁸³ “Why We Fight This War,” Eminutemen.com Blog, accessed 12 FEB 2007, <http://www.eminutemen.com/whyWar.htm>

⁸⁴ Adam Pashut, comment on “Dr. Assam Al-Tamimi: A Political-Ideological Brief,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 163, posted 19 February 2004, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16304>

Mufti of Egypt. He said, “any attempt to invade Iraq is forbidden by Islamic religious law and by morality, and Islam forbids it, and even commands its believers to resist attempts at invasion and occupation.”⁸⁵ This Islamic and Lockean ideology is manipulated to justify the inadvertent killing of fellow Muslim citizens. Dr. Muhammad Al-Imam- a lecturer on Islamic Law at the Alexandria Law Facility- insists:

The religious authorities have allowed (even) the killing of a Muslim, if the heretic enemy is using him as a shield and there is no other way of killing this heretic, but to kill the Muslim along with him. In such a case, the killing of the Muslim is permitted.⁸⁶

The U.S. Administration justifies its Leviathan-style actions in Iraq and elsewhere by claiming that they are aimed to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe,” and their goal is to “make freedom and the development of democratic institutions (the) key themes”⁸⁷ guiding their global actions. Many current Western editorialists, columnists and authors agree with this stance. Joel Mowbray, in his on-line column titled *Why We Fight*, claims, “the War on Terror isn’t just about intelligence or military; it is about creating a world dominated by the only true antidote to terrorism: freedom.”⁸⁸ He also asserts:

Democracy and liberty must take hold in Iraq, making permanent the freedom the Iraqi people have just begun to taste. Iraq can become that shining City on a Hill for the Middle East, injecting its neighbors with an unquenchable thirst for freedom.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Steven Stalinski, comment on “Leading Egyptian Islamic Clerics on Jihad Against U.S. Troops in Iraq: March-August 2003,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 145, posted 14 August 2003, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA14503>

⁸⁶ “Debating the Religious, Political, and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bombings: Part III,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No.65, posted 26 July 2001, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA65010>

⁸⁷ “National Security Strategy of the United States, The 2002/2006,” accessed 12 FEB 2007, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html

⁸⁸ Joel Mowbray, comment on “Why We Fight,” Townhall.com Blog, accessed 06 DEC 2004, <http://www.townhall.com/columnists/joelmowbray/jm20030414.shtml>

⁸⁹ Ibid.

Yet despite apparent successes that U.S. military intervention and burgeoning democracy have brought to the peoples of Iraq through employment of the Leviathan approach, Iraqis and others continue to resist. Why? Many hold the perception that the Leviathan effort to promote democracy through invasion and violence also “kills those it is supposed to be ‘liberating’ - a moral conundrum that few of the advocates of America’s ‘Benevolent Hegemony’ acknowledge, let alone have an answer to.”⁹⁰ Also, there are many Muslims who hold the same beliefs as Al-Tamimi that the imposition of American and Western-based forms of democracy on the Islamic world are formulated on the “separation of religion and state and on ruling the people via legislating laws that contradict the way of Allah and permit what Allah has prohibited.”⁹¹ Although this claim is rooted in Islamic religious teaching, the fact that distrust of Western democracy and political authority exists can not be ignored. It is also recognized by many that “transition towards democracy is not simple in a country that most of its inhabitants embrace a religious school of faith, which is not prone...to openness and condescension of political authorities to the people.”⁹²

These assertions apply equally well in the more likely relationship where religious allegiances are manipulated to achieve political ends through violent means, and theocratic authority is more readily accepted when there is a serious breakdown in order which the political

⁹⁰ Justin Raimondo, comment on “Why We Fight- A Reminder,” antiwar.com Blog, posted 19 NOV 2004, <http://www.etherzone.com/2004/raim111904.shtml>

⁹¹ Suleiman Abu Gheith, comment on “Why We Fight America,” The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series No. 388, posted 12 June 2002, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP38802>

⁹² Adam Pashut, comment on “Dr. Assam Al-Tamimi: A Political-Ideological Brief,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 163, posted 19 February 2004, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16304>

government can not control.⁹³ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, an expert in contemporary Middle Eastern affairs and Islamic politics, and a current scholar teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, furthers this argument that religion is a secondary issue subordinate to political sovereignty:

The literature on Islamism would place emphasis on the imperative of legitimacy, arguing that the turn to Islamization was a reactive policy- a type of survival strategy- to protect the state from serious challenges to its authority.⁹⁴

Mary R. Habeck, an associate professor of history at Yale University and author of the book titled *Knowing the Enemy- Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, reinforces this train of thought by adding:

A second way of viewing the conflict between Islam and the rest of the world is through the lens of the Qur'anic word *taghut* (tyranny). By identifying leaders of the liberal West- men like Bush, Blair, or Berlusconi- with this religious term, the jihadis are able to claim that they share the characteristics of the tyrants mentioned in the sacred texts. They can then argue that, as with Pharaoh and other godless oppressors of the Qur'an and hadith, so the unbelievers today want to dominate the world.⁹⁵

Resentment also exists toward the adoption of democratic principles by perceived “secular elites that do not care of anything besides the peel-like imitation of the west.”⁹⁶ Yet above all, Muslims resent the recent perceived U.S. imposition of democracy in Iraq because of the method employed- Leviathan intervention and use of force perceived as illegitimate- which people espousing the same views as A-Tamimi vow to resist in true Lockean fashion:

⁹³ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters of the Army, December 2006), pg 1-21, para 1-114.

⁹⁴ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan- Islam and the Making of State Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7.

⁹⁵ Mary R. Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy- Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 87.

⁹⁶ Adam Pashut, comment on “Dr. Assam Al-Tamimi: A Political-Ideological Brief,” *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 163, posted 19 February 2004, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16304>

The U.S. boasts, with unprecedented impudence, that it is a pioneer of human rights and fertile ground for the growth of democracy, as it strikes with a sword at anyone it wants to educate.⁹⁷

Numerous arguments have been presented by both sides of the tension stating that the United States' *willingness* to enact Leviathan intervention stems from the country's overwhelming *ability* to maintain and utilize military force. Yet America's military might, largely unchecked by the remainder of the global community, remains challenged in Iraq to this day. The reason for this is rooted not only in the Arab-Islamic willingness to resist in concert with Locke's ideology concerning illegitimate authority, but also in their ability to adjust their methods to meet the threat. Dr. Mustafa Al-Shka' - a member of the Al-Azhar Islamic Studies Center- states, "We were commanded to fight against the enemy using all means. Our [military] capability does not equal theirs, and therefore we should modify our means."⁹⁸ As witnessed by Al-Tamimi, methods reprehensible to Western thinking have become mainstream in Israel, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Islamic world:

As far as the military effort is concerned, it does not require much funding. What do you need, really? What sort of weapons does Hamas use? It's the human being. The courage of one man. It is the most valuable of resources. As for some of the operations, the suicidal operations, they require volunteers but the cost in money is near zero. The bomb-making technique is available to everybody. It's on the Internet and the material is available in any corner shop that sells fertilizers. Therefore there's no big deal, really. If you want to do something, you do it.⁹⁹

Hobbes' philosophy directly refutes this use of suicidal violence in the name of martyrdom due to his materialist perspective and faith in only the observable, physical world:

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ "Debating the Religious, Political, and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bombings: Part III," *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No.65, posted 26 July 2001, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA65010>

⁹⁹ Adam Pashut, comment on "Dr. Assam Al-Tamimi: A Political-Ideological Brief," *The Middle East Media Research Institute*, Inquiry and Analysis Series No. 163, posted 19 February 2004, <http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA16304>

There be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce, and consequently be just and reasonable; such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent. But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith, but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying that they know it supernaturally or that they know those that knew them that knew others that knew it supernaturally, breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason or nature.¹⁰⁰

The US Army's December 2006 Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, directly concedes, "The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means."¹⁰¹ However, today's insurgents recognize that their path toward legitimacy involves "thrusting the local population into the state of nature" by "eliminating the vestiges of government authority."¹⁰² Unfortunately, the reciprocating philosophical theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke will be forever caught in a perpetual state of tension and conflict. The cycle of violence will continue unabated as long as the U.S. and its allies continue to utilize military might as an isolated method of intervention and counterinsurgency to maintain desired states of peace and social harmony. Their adversaries, unwilling to recognize and accept their authority, yet lacking conventional military power for a balanced response, will continue in their willingness to utilize deplorable methods to resist:

The character of Islamist movements in the region will be highly affected by the nature of Washington's future activism and interventionism in the Muslim

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Idaho: University of Idaho)
<http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hobbes%20Leviathan/FIRST.txt>

¹⁰¹ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters of the Army, December 2006), pg 1-21, para 1-11.

¹⁰² LTC Raymond Millen, "The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency," *Parameters- US Army War College Quarterly* Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 2006-07): 8.

world. Indeed, *U.S. policy will probably be the central external determinant upon the evolution of Islamist movements and governments.* At this stage of development, Islamic movements have assumed the role of the key guardians of the national honor, sovereignty, and “Islamic authenticity” and therefore, by definition, will be among the first forces to adopt anti-American rhetoric in the event of U.S.-Muslim state confrontation. That quasi-nationalist aspect *need not be automatically anti-American, but in reality it is nearly invariably anti-American* in the face of almost all present U.S. policies in the region.¹⁰³

There are particular merits associated with both theories, and at times both theories are utilized equally by both sides of the conflict- not necessarily in a “clash between civilization and barbarity, between light and darkness, between freedom and serfdom,”¹⁰⁴ as people such as Samuel P. Huntington and others may suggest, but rather in a clash of philosophies best represented by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. If the predicaments of the two competitors were suddenly reversed, the philosophies predominantly adopted would likely reverse, yet the outcomes would likely remain unchanged. The problem remains one of perceived and actual legitimacy, and without it the actions taken by *any* Leviathan will continue to be violently resisted.

¹⁰³ Graham E Fuller, *The Future of Political Islam* (New York: Palmgrave Macmillan, 2004), 158.

¹⁰⁴ Scott Shore, comment on “Why We Fight,” The IntellectualConservative Blog, Accessed 12 FEB 2007, <http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article2252.html>

CONCLUSION- Resolution through Common Ground and Reason

Throughout this monograph, it has been shown that the current tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds can be explained and understood by applying the Western philosophical theories proposed by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke- namely the reciprocating ideological themes present in Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*. The tension originates from one simple source- perceptions of legitimacy. The problem involves developing comprehensive solutions which address legitimacy, not the individual symptoms of this tension.

This hypothesis proves correct for several reasons. First, based on the development and application of logical falsafa during the formative classical period of Arab-Islamic thought, it can be demonstrated that Arab-Islamic thinking possesses grounding in Western logic and reason. Until the advent of Sufism and the wide-spread dogmatic imposition of religious prophesy to ensure political and social stability, falsafa had been relatively successful in balancing logos with mythos, reason with rhetoric, and philosophy with religion. This underlying Arab-Islamic capacity to apply logos over mythos confirms the potential for application of Hobbes' and Locke's logical theories when determining the source of today's tension.

Secondly, the political, social, and religious conditions present in seventeenth century Great Britain appear similar to those conditions present within today's tension, both internally within the Arab-Islamic world and externally when compared to the Western world. The period in which both Hobbes and Locke developed their differing theories concerning relative states of nature, recognition of sovereignty and rights to resist illegitimate authority contains many of the same issues, concerns, and manipulations present today. Demands for safety and security, representative and authoritative yet accountable government, and religious unity without selective subjugation are present in both periods. Political authorities, vying for control and influence over

moderate majorities, have manipulated these conditions to encourage heinous acts and garner support for their particular agendas and forms of sovereignty. Both Hobbes' and Locke's theories have been conversely accepted and applied, and the unremitting violence that results demonstrates the inherent tension between both the philosophers' ideas and the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds.

Finally, when applying further scrutiny to the tension evident today between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds, it is easy to conclude that the continuing application of the diametrically opposed theories developed by Hobbes and Locke will not cure the tension but only serve to exacerbate it. Unilateral hegemonic activities, advocated by the United States in response to insecurity generated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and modeled after Hobbes' *Leviathan*, have been violently resisted by the Arab-Islamic world, which for a variety of reasons largely views Western global sovereignty with distrust and contempt. Add to this the internal struggle within the Arab-Islamic world concerning historical tensions between acceptance of centralized authority and underlying Bedouin desires to remain nomadic and rhizomatic, and a serious lack of legitimacy results. The current public record is replete with both logical and rhetorical examples of Hobbesian demands for security through authoritative action and Lockean calls to resist sovereignty viewed as illegitimate. The cycle of violence, enhanced through manipulation of political, social, and religious beliefs, has led to a situation where mythos has largely outweighed logos, and perceived legitimacy for either side has proved largely unattainable.

Existing recommendations on how to lessen this current tension are as numerous and varied as the number of casual explanations. Yet just as those casual explanations remain largely limited or amorphous in focus, so do the recommended remedies. Although all the symptoms of this tension must be addressed at various tactical, operational and strategic levels, any singular or specialized focus will fail to cure the disease. Calls for increased military interventionism or a

complete unilateral withdrawal and a return to U.S. isolationism, disillusionment and naiveté will either kill the patient or remove the doctor from the hospital. Comprehensive steps are needed to restore and maintain Western legitimacy in the eyes of Arab-Islamic world. This does not involve abdication of our rights and protection of our vital national interests, but rather a conscientious effort to apply logic and reason to all of our activities, policies, and communications. Whether our actions are of a *Leviathan* nature- replete with the type of hubris demonstrated by Charles I and Oliver Cromwell in seventeenth century Great Britain, or whether they adopt a more balanced approach intending to guarantee and protect the human rights and natural laws inherent in Locke's state of nature, the rigors of logic and reason must be applied to the formulation of those actions to enhance their legitimacy. What can be determined, utilizing Western and Arab-Islamic history and current events analyzed through the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, is that if a perceived singular Leviathan approach is adopted by the United States and the Western world, Arab-Islamic resistance will continue unabated.

However, some Western thinkers advocate an overwhelming increase in the use of force to protect self interests, prevent insurrection, reduce insecurity, and foster economic globalization through imposition of external sovereignty and influence. Thomas Friedman insists that Arab-Islamic politics are simultaneously influenced by three political traditions: 1) Tribe-like politics; 2) a historical aversion to authoritarianism and the view that "the ruler was often a stranger: someone to be feared, dreaded, avoided, submitted to, and, occasionally, rebelled against, but rarely adored;" and 3) the modern nation-state: a recent and unstable development in the Middle East. Because of these three paradoxical traditions, the form of rule imposed from above has historically been authoritarian and of two forms: gentle and brutal.¹⁰⁵ Action in Hama, Syria in 1982- where the Assad government found it necessary to violently subjugate the population to

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1995), 87-92.

remain unopposed- and other like examples are utilized by pro-Leviathan advocates to espouse the effectiveness of such tactics. They routinely insist that pre-disposed Arab-Islamic tendencies render them universally susceptible to such an approach. Citing the Arab *Fahlawi*, or “sharp-witted, clever personality,” Raphael Patai asserts that “the desire for reward or the fear of punishments” predominate Arab-Islamic thinking:

The Fahlawi does not look upon authority or leadership as something necessary . . . but rather as an irresistible power to which the individual resigns himself submissively when it implants fear and dread in his soul. ¹⁰⁶

Yet to insist that the Western world- particularly the United States- should universally employ tactics and strategies compliant with Hobbes’ philosophy in light of their previous application and presumed likelihood of success based on universal descriptions of social characteristics is to adhere to a deterministic and fallacious argument. Isolated events such as the invasion of Afghanistan do not justify universal application. This is not sound application of logic and reason, and in the interests of enhancing legitimacy, might does not always make right. It is easy to fall into the trap of repressing the tension’s symptoms for a short period of time, only to witness them reappear in a more malignant, coordinated, and uncontrollable form at some point in the future. *A priori* solutions do not exist for today’s tension. Therefore, Hobbes’ theory proves irrational when universally- or even predominantly- applied, for many outliers, contingencies, and human variables complicate the issue, such as Locke’s calls to resist illegitimate authority.

The historical ability demonstrated by both sides to apply logos over mythos and reason over rhetoric presents the opportunity and necessity to rigorously pursue logical solutions which both sides will accept. Efforts are already underway, but require more attention and focus:

¹⁰⁶ Raphael Patai, *The Arab Mind* (New York: Haterleigh Press, 2002), 116-117.

The combination of Islamic and Western traditions in the Middle East has already been undertaken, and this process cannot be reversed. What is subject to change is the way both are interpreted. With proper understanding and implementation of the nobler aspects of each heritage, the cross-fertilization will be relatively free of problems, for these very dimensions are most compatible. What the peoples of the Middle East are groping for is a sociopolitical-intellectual culture of their own, drawn from Islam and parts of other complete traditions and systems but uniquely theirs nevertheless.¹⁰⁷

Common understanding and acceptance of legitimacy can be obtained through application of reason- an endeavor which will reach the same conclusion independent of existing cultural and religious differences. Encouragement and exploitation of the similarities between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds to the maximum extent possible is required, with continuous effort made to avoid employment of political, social, or religious rhetoric which only encourages further emotional and cultural polarization. Tendencies to denounce rather than understand or even acknowledge the opposing side's legitimate concerns often undermine efforts to persuade, seduce, or even coerce them to accept certain positions and points of view- even when a logical argument is presented. Serious attention must be paid to the opposing side's concerns and grievances, and both sides should be encouraged to logically refute assertions that they are incapable of reason, devoid of faith and morality, and predisposed to certain patterns of behavior. Attempts to identify sources of common ground and interest will prove fruitful, and will focus attention away from unalterable cultural differences which tend to be overemphasized at the expense of common reason and similar experience. Desires for local and regional security and stability, economic stabilization and uninterrupted flow of resources, improved standards of living, and authentic representative government provide a common framework from which to apply reason and diplomatic exchange. Reasoned resolution of common security issues, expectations gaps, and power struggles will do much to enhance perceptions of legitimacy on

¹⁰⁷ Alan R. Taylor, *The Islamic Question in Middle East Politics* (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 126.

both sides, and will in turn provide the support required for harsher measures employed against radical Islamic holdouts.

Obviously, the acceptable influence of religion and politics will remain a serious issue to contend with, and endeavors to commonly define the roles of each will take time. But concerted energy expended toward forming reasoned argument and resolution based on common understanding and logical premises will yield incremental yet compounding political changes which will prove beneficial and unifying for all sides involved. The ability to provide positive examples to reinforce these efforts is imperative to success in this endeavor. For both sides, these examples involve a commitment to reducing domestic poverty, unfair economic practices, crime, and political corruption. Due to the global information age, political, social, and religious media and information conduits have a moral responsibility to reduce sensationalism, curb indecency, and limit emotional rhetoric- all while stopping short of repressing freedom of speech. Globally, both sides must work to reduce statements of open defiance against international institutions and standards, coercive economic practices, and disregard for the environment. Failure to actively pursue improvements in these areas will continue to undermine all attempts at reasoned exchange and erode legitimacy. Once such efforts are made by legitimate players on both sides, the illegitimate actions of radical individuals and organizations can be dealt with in a more effective manner acceptable to both sides.

The moderate Arab-Islamic world must also be encouraged, through public dialogue and debate, to revive its historical practices of balancing reasoned philosophy with religion. This in turn will render its population less susceptible to religious rhetoric and dogma, open to Western logical reasoning, and more accepting of occasional Leviathan actions required to suppress violent extremist activity and maintain security at the local, regional, and global levels. The universal desire for safety and security must guide all reasoned arguments and logical decisions, and these efforts will largely serve to garner the support of moderate majorities who only desire

peace, security, and rights to self-determination. Finally, effort is required to ensure that neither side of today's tension perceives the other as encroaching on their natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Failure to do so will undermine reasoned, common perceptions of legitimacy due to reinforcement of perceived threats against security, authenticity, and autonomy. In turn, today's tension between the Western and Arab-Islamic worlds- based on the reciprocating Hobbes-Locke cycle of violence- will remain unresolved through the end of the twenty-first century.

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